Envy-Free Allocations for Random Non-Additive Valuations

Source abstract

Benade et al. (EC 2024) introduced a semi-random model for non-additive fair division in which each agent starts with an arbitrary base valuation over bundles of items and independently permutes the item names uniformly at random. While they proved that envy-free allocations exist with high probability as the number of items grows for $n = 2$ agents, they left open whether the same holds for $n > 2$ agents. We resolve this open question in the affirmative: for any fixed number of agents $n$ and any number of items $m$ divisible by $n$, an envy-free allocation exists with probability $1 - o(1)$ as $m \to \infty$. Our proof combines the second moment method with a connection to the (small-set) expansion of generalized Johnson graphs, which may be of independent interest.