Distributed Resilient Control of DC Microgrid Subject to Time-Varying False Data Injection Attacks
Ziqi Xu, Zhenyu Gao, Yongtao Wei, Feng Guo
Source abstract
Focusing on the issue that false data injection (FDI) attacks on the secondary controllers of DC microgrids can affect the normal and stable operation of microgrids, a distributed resilient controller for DC microgrids is proposed to ensure that the two control objectives, voltage regulation and current sharing, can still be achieved under the action of time-varying bounded FDI attacks. First, the distributed secondary control problem of the microgrid is viewed as a leader–follower multi-agent consensus problem, and the impact of FDI attacks on the microgrid is analyzed. Second, a fully distributed resilient controller based on an adaptive compensation mechanism is designed to compensate for FDI attacks and mitigate their impact on the microgrid. Next, it is proven through Lyapunov stability theory that the microgrid can operate normally and stably under the designed distributed resilient controller, achieving the two control objectives. Finally, simulation analysis is used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed resilient control method.
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