Strategic Interview Positioning under Uncertain Self-Rank

Source abstract

We study interview positioning in the secretary problem when an applicant is uncertain about their own absolute rank. The employer uses a given rejection threshold, and the applicant's self-rank distribution is truncated geometric. We show that the applicant need only compare the first eligible position with the final position and that, for finite $n$, a unique critical value exists precisely when $r(r+1)>n-1$. If $r_n$ is the employer's rejection threshold and $r_n/n\toα\in(0,1)$ as $n\to\infty$, then $$\lim_{n\to\infty}q_c(n,r_n) = q_c(α) = \frac{1-α}{1-α+α^2}.$$ Thus uncertainty about absolute rank produces an explicit asymptotic phase transition in optimal interview positioning.