Equilibrium Joining Strategies for Queues in Two-Phase Random Environment
Konstantin Avrachenkov, Uri Yechiali
Source abstract
We study equilibrium joining strategies in an M/M/1-type queueing system with strategic customers operating in a two-phase random environment described as a continuous-time Markov process. Strategic customers, upon arrival, choose whether to join or to balk based on available information and anticipated utility, considering the trade-off between reward from service and waiting cost. Four observation scenarios are analysed: fully observable (both queue length and environment phase are disclosed to a customer upon arrival), queue-only observable, environment-only observable, and fully unobservable. In each case, equilibrium joining strategies are analysed. In the environment-only observable and fully unobservable cases, explicit solutions and equilibrium conditions are derived under rapid oscillations and under very slow transitions between environment phases.
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