Rational Probabilistic Deciders—Part II: Collective Behavior
P. T. Kabamba, W.-C. Lin, S. M. Meerkov
Source abstract
This paper explores the behavior of rational probabilistic deciders (RPDs) in three types of collectives: zero sum matrix games, fractional interactions, and Edgeworth exchange economies. The properties of steady states and transients are analyzed as a function of the level of rationality, N , and, in some cases, the size of the collective, M . It is shown that collectives of RPDs, may or may not behave rationally, depending, for instance, on the relationship between N and M (under fractional interactions) or N and the minimum amount of product exchange (in Edgeworth economies). The results obtained can be useful for designing rational reconfigurable systems that can autonomously adapt to changing environments.
Evidence graph
No public relationships recorded yet.
Integrity note: This page is a factual metadata record created by deterministic ingestion. It is not a claim that the work moves a mathematical frontier or has been independently verified.